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UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMIES ARE typically caught in the so-called 
“vicious circle of poverty,” a circle running from low income to small 
savings to small capital accumulations to a continuation of low in- 
come. Taxation can be used to break the circle by forcing a higher 
rate of savings from the meager income of these countries. 
During 1928-36, a period of nine fiscal years, the Nationalist 
government of China committed itself to a program of accelerated 
industrialization of the economy. To help finance this program, 
numerous reforms were made in the Chinese tax system in the direc- 
tion of increasing its revenue productivity. Yet, even as late as 1936, 
the combined tax collections of all levels of the Chinese government 
amounted to no more than 4 per cent of China’s gross national 
product. This fact is surprising, since the corresponding percentages 
for other underdeveloped economies (e.g., India, Guatemala, and 
Chile) have been found to be considerably higher. Why, then, was 
the Chinese tax system during the Nanking period’ unable to absorb 
a larger percentage of China’s gross national product? 
One possible answer to this query could be that the expenditures 
of the Chinese governments were not contributing much to the imme- 
diate consumption needs of the people. If that was the case, the pro- 
portionate taxable capacity would be low in a poor country like 
China. In  this connection it is pertinent to note that the Chinese na- 
tional government, which was financially far more important than 
the provincial and hsien (county) governments combined, devoted 
roughly 44 per cent of its total expenditures during the Nanking 
period to military purposes. 
But, while the heavy military outlays of the Nanking government 
did lower China’s proportionate taxable capacity, the tax system 
itself was the primary cause of its low revenue productivity. I n  
China, as in the United States, taxes were levied by three levels of 
government: the national, provincial, and hsien governments. The 
* A  dissertation completed at Northwestern University in 1956. 
1. For convenience, the period 1928-36 may be referred to simply as the “Nanking 
period,” since during those nine years Nanking, not Peiping, was the capital of China. 
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national tax system, which was about two and a half times as impor- 
tant as the provincial and hsien tax systems combined, was very 
primitive in its structure. Over 90 per cent of its revenue came from 
taxes on commodities. In the order of their importance, the major 
taxes were customs duties, the salt tax, and excises on the production 
of five basic commodities. The system did not impose a tax on per- 
sonal income until 1936, in which year income tax receipts accounted 
for roughly 1 per cent of national tax revenue. At the provincial and 
hsicn levels, the financial pillar was the land tax, a proportional tax 
on agricultural income. In 1936 land tax receipts totaled $188 mil- 
lion. That this was a meager sum becomes apparent when one realizes 
that in 1936 as much as 70 per cent of China’s gross national product 
of $25.9 billion originated in agriculture and that the land tax was 
the only tax directly reaching agricultural income. Even assuming 
that the land tax rested entirely on the agricultural sector, the re!a- 
tive burden as measured by the average tax rate would have been 
only approximately 1 per cent of the gross agricultural product. The 
study concludes, therefore, that the inability of the Nanking tax sys- 
tem to absorb a greater share of China’s gross national product can 
be attributed largely to the lightness with which agricultural income 
was taxed. 
Finally, in view of the preponderance of commodity taxes and thc 
virtual absence of any tax on income, the Nanking tax system must 
be adjudged to be highly regressive in the distribution of its burden. 
The Nanking tax system, therefore, not only failed as an instrument 
of rapid capital formation; it was also highly inequitable. 
